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The Thoughtful Self 
Sheila J. Cunningham, Abertay University 
A theoretical understanding of embodiment requires an appreciation of the links 
between the external environment and the cognitive or thoughtful self, because the 
embodied self exists at the interface between the outside world and internal cognition. It is 
therefore important to consider how the self is conceptualised in cognition, and how self 
processing influences thought. The current chapter aims to provide an overview of the bi-
directional relationship between the self and cognition. 
The term ‘self’ is a deceptively simple word. It is used frequently and understood 
with ease in everyday conversation, and is generally perceived to be basic to our experience 
as conscious human beings. However, it is a challenging concept to study scientifically - as a 
psychological construct, the self is deeply intangible, and notoriously difficult to define or 
measure. Attempts to understand the self from a psychological perspective tend to 
distinguish between two aspects. First is the subjective self or ‘I’, the embodied experience 
of existing as a continuous entity across time. This can be contrasted with the objective self 
or ‘me’, the body of knowledge (e.g., memories, trait characteristics) that are associated 
with that continuous entity and are considered in the first person.  
Embodiment definition: The relationship between 
a concept in the external world (e.g., the self), and 
its representation in cognition. 
2 
 
 
Being considerably easier to measure scientifically, the objective self has been the 
topic of more research than the subjective self. It is possible to measure the emergence and 
extent of self-knowledge even in pre-verbal humans, and non-human animals. For example, 
the famous ‘mirror recognition test’ is argued to show the development of the objective self 
– a small mark is unobtrusively placed on a child’s face, and they are then exposed to their 
image in a mirror. If the child touches their own face rather than the mirror in response to 
seeing the unexpected mark, this shows they have understood that the mirror shows their 
reflection and suggests they can recognise themselves as an object in the world. Later in life, 
once children are able to verbalise, follow instructions and respond reliably to visual cues, 
the objective self can be measured more directly by asking about or applying knowledge 
such as autobiographical memories and character traits. 
All kinds of everyday situations trigger the application of self-knowledge. Our 
awareness of current goals, owned objects and personal tastes guide many actions, and a 
significant part of our consciousness is devoted to re-living autobiographical events, or 
planning future activities involving ourselves. If we enter a room and overhear someone 
saying our name, or perceive another person drinking from our coffee cup, these self-
referent cues have reliable enhancing effects on our attention and memory. These are 
examples of the biases in cognition associated with self, which ensure that information of 
relevance to us personally is not missed or forgotten. These biases are the focus of the 
current chapter. 
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2.5.1 Self-Reference Effects in Attention 
The example above of being able to detect and attend to someone saying your name 
is an experience most people can relate to. In such a circumstance, it would be extremely 
difficult to ignore the person using your name, and maintain polite attention to your current 
conversation. This attention capture by own-names (often referred to as the ‘cocktail party 
effect’) is well-established in the laboratory. As early as 1959, Moray described a dichotic 
listening task in which participants listen to two different passages of information 
simultaneously, one delivered to each ear. Participants were asked to pay close attention to 
ether the left or right ear (the ‘attended’ channel), but when their own name appeared in 
the ‘unattended’ channel, they were unable to stop their attention shifting towards it, 
missing information they were supposed to hear as a result. Many studies have reported 
similar findings across the years, showing that there is a robust tendency for one’s own 
name to capture attention.  
Own-names are perhaps the ultimate self-reference cue, an environmental trigger 
that alerts us that something is happening which may be of relevance to us. Own-faces also 
have a similar effect – if you were flicking through a magazine and momentarily caught sight 
of your own image, you would almost certainly stop flicking and go back to find the 
glimpsed image. This attention capture is shown by studies in which self-faces are presented 
alongside images of other faces in search tasks, while brain responses are monitored using 
electroencephalography (EEG). Participants are significantly faster to find their own face 
than other images, and when a participant’s own face is presented in an experiment, this 
also evokes a characteristic ‘P300’ neural signal. The P300 is a change in brain signal that is 
associated with attention capture – for example, it is evoked by tasks in which an oddball 
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stimulus (e.g., a red letter in a series of black letter) appears. This pattern of neural response 
is therefore consistent with performance on the attention shifting tasks, suggesting that 
self-images are powerful attention capturing cues.  
Speaking to the effectiveness and power of self-referent cues, attention capture can 
occur even when the self-image is an unwanted distracter. If a participant’s own name or 
face is presented as a distracter while they are attempting to complete a task, this can shift 
attention away from the current task, even if the participant is trying to consciously avoid 
changing the focus of their attention. These self-cues are also very effective at sustaining 
attention – when attention is captured by a self-image, this is not a fleeting response but 
tends to be maintained across time, perhaps explaining the distracting effect of self-cues. 
 The pairing of one’s own name or face with the self is an association so frequently 
encountered from a young age that it seems logical that these cues can very quickly and 
effectively trigger self-referential biases in attention. However, the cues that can trigger self-
referent effects in attention actually extend widely beyond own-names and own-faces. 
Indeed, even cues that have short-lived and arbitrary associations with self can attract 
attention as a result of that association. One widely-studied method of assigning self-
relevance to an item is through ownership. Research suggests that when objects are given 
to participants to own (even temporarily, for the purpose of a game during the experiment) 
then these objects can evoke self-referent effects on attention. Demonstrating this effect, 
Turk et al. (2011) presented participants with a shopping game in which images of grocery 
items were assigned to ownership by the participant or another person. Ownership was 
indicated by a colour cue that appeared next to the grocery item (e.g., an apple with a blue 
dot above it would indicate that the ‘blue’ player owned the apple). Turk et al. measured 
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neural signals while participants viewed the images, and found that when the colour cue 
indicated that the object would be owned by the participant, this evoked the characteristic 
P300 response that indicates attention capture. Further, there was evidence of additional 
visual processing of self-owned items, with visuo-spatial attention narrowing to focus on the 
object and therefore not responding to cues presented elsewhere on-screen. This 
experiment suggests that there does not have to be a long-held association between self 
and an external cue for that cue to capture attention; a self-relevant context is sufficient to 
activate the self-reference effect on attention. 
Associated with the attentional effects of self-relevance, 
other researchers have reported increased perceptual 
processing of items temporarily associated with the self. In one 
paradigm, Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) showed that 
participants are able to identify shapes that represent 
themselves more quickly than shapes representing others 
(imagine you are the triangle, the square is a your friend; Sui et al., 2012). Not only are these 
self-referenced shapes recognised more quickly, but they are more discernible when they 
are blurred or distorted that shapes representing other people. As these perceptual effects 
suggest, the self-reference effect occurs very early in the processing stream. When cues are 
encountered, they are first perceived by the visual system in the brain, before being 
identified as self-referent and triggering a reactive response in the brain’s attention system. 
These effects are therefore very quick, automatic and reliable. 
The automatic nature of self-reference effects on attention suggests they are a very 
basic feature of human cognition. This raises the important question of what functional role 
Perceptual processing: The 
process of observing, 
perceiving and interpreting 
visual stimuli. Occurs with 
increased speed when visual 
stimuli are located within the 
focus of attention. 
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self-processing biases in attention may play. Interestingly, other attention-grabbing stimuli 
share a common feature of being useful from a survival perspective. For example, 
threatening images (e.g., angry faces) or goal relevant images (e.g., of food when we are 
hungry) capture attention for good reasons – in this case, to give us the chance to escape 
the threat, or meet our goal. It is clearly adaptive to have a system that prioritises attention 
to these cues. Similarly, it seems logical to suppose that the self-reference effect on 
attention could be adaptive; we have evolved to live and work in hierarchical social groups 
and are very sensitive to social information. In such an environment, we need to be very 
aware of when someone else is discussing information about us, touches items belonging to 
us, or otherwise acts in a way that has relevance to us. Thus attention-capture by self-
relevant cues serves an adaptive purpose, ensuring that information of potential personal 
importance is not missed.  
The self-referent biases considered above are concerned with early processing 
responses – fast perception and attention capture. However, in order to be genuinely 
useful, it is vital that information is successfully retained once it has been attended to. To 
that end, there are also self-referent biases higher up the cognitive processing stream that 
ensure self-relevant information is not forgotten once it has been noticed. 
 
2.5.2 Self-Reference Effects in Memory and Cognition 
When information is encoded in a self-referent context, that information is more 
likely to be subsequently remembered than similar information encoded in different 
contexts. This is the classic self reference effect (SRE) in memory, which has been 
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established in cognitive psychology since the 1970s. During that decade, many prominent 
psychologists were following a line of research seeking to clarify what makes information 
memorable. A general rule to emerge is that the deeper the processing, the greater the 
memorability. (Deep processing requires meaningful consideration of the incoming 
information, whereas shallow processing involves little or superficial consideration, as the 
name implies.) In their seminal depth of processing paper, Craik and Lockhart (1972) 
showed that the memorability of a list of words could be increased or decreased by 
changing the processing task at encoding. If participants were asked to consider whether 
each word had a positive or negative meaning (semantic processing – a ‘deep’ task) then 
they were more likely to remember these words than if they had were asked to decide 
whether they had been presented in lower or upper case letters (a ‘shallow’ task). These 
findings established that depth of processing was key to memorability. 
Following Craik and Lockhart’s proposals, Rogers et al. (1977) proposed the self-
reference effect as a depth of processing phenomenon. They contrasted semantic and 
shallow encoding tasks with a newly-developed self-referential encoding task, in which 
participants were asked to consider whether or not a trait word was true of themselves 
(e.g., ‘is the word in big letters?’ v. ‘does the word mean the same as…?’ v. ‘does the word 
describe you?’). They found that self-referencing gave rise to better memory than even 
other deep processing tasks, suggestion that the self provided an exceptional boost to 
encoding. 
In the forty years since Rogers et al. first described the self reference effect on 
memory, there has been an enormous quantity of research replicating and extending the 
basic findings. This has confirmed that the self-reference effect is highly robust and reliable. 
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Considering character traits in relation to oneself (e.g., “Are you calm?” ) does not just 
ensure better memory for those traits relative to semantic encoding, but also relative to 
consideration of other people’s characters (e.g., “Is Tom Cruise tidy”?). Interestingly, 
consideration of very close other referents such as one’s mother does moderate the effect; 
a smaller self-reference effect reliably emerges when the contrasting other person is a close 
relative than a famous celebrity. 
The moderation of the self-reference effect in 
memory by close others provides some insight into one of 
the key mechanisms likely to support the effect: the body of 
person-knowledge stored in long-term memory. Imagine 
you have been asked whether the word ‘modest’ describes 
you. While processing this question, you are likely to 
retrieve a rich quantity of autobiographical memories 
against which you can judge the validity of this characteristic. You may remember specific 
instances of modest behaviour, or the  contrary, and these instances are likely to be 
relatively vividly recalled. Being asked the same question of your mother or best friend 
provides the potential to access rich personal memories of shared experiences, but the 
store of memories will be lower and less accessible than the store of self-referent 
memories. Being even less familiar, the task of considering whether a famous actor 
possesses a particular character trait is even less likely to allow access to a rich knowledge 
base. This means that when you are subsequently asked in a memory test whether you 
recall the trait words being presented, those you encoded with reference to yourself are 
Long term memory: The body of 
information stored in memory for a  
theoretically unlimited time. 
Retrieval of information from long 
term memory can be improved by 
factors including frequent access,  
the presence of retrieval cues and 
storage within an organised 
network of associated information. 
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likely to be associated with the most elaborate memory trace and so are more retrievable 
than those encoded about the other-referent traits.   
The impact of support by the self-knowledge framework was neatly demonstrated 
by Klein and Loftus (1988), who showed that the self-reference effect is supported by boosts 
in both elaboration and organisation provided by the self-concept. Klein and Loftus 
compared the effects of self-referencing with two other strategies, one known to increase 
memory by encouraging elaboration and one that has the same effect by increasing 
organisation. The elaboration strategy was implemented by asking participants to learn a 
list of words (printed on cards) by defining each word in turn. This encourages deep 
processing, thinking about the details associated with each word in turn to create a rich 
memory representation. For the organisational strategy, participants were asked to sort the 
cards into semantic categories. This encourages categorical processing that emphasises links 
between the words, so when one word is recalled this 
increases the chances of recalling another from the same 
category. Finally, a self-referencing strategy was used in which 
participants considered whether the word reminded them of 
an autobiographical event. By comparing the pattern of 
memory performance following the elaboration, organisation 
and self-referencing for different word sets, Klein and Loftus 
were able to demonstrate the self-referencing provides both 
elaboration and organisation support. The body of self-
knowledge is so rich and well-connected that it allows us to 
Categorical processing: Individual 
items of information are stored 
within networks of associated 
items, creating organised clusters 
or categories in memory. 
Activation of a category improves 
the accessibility of related 
information because activation 
spreads through the associative 
network. Items encoded through 
categorical processing are 
therefore more likely to be 
remembered. 
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create rich, elaborate memory representations during encoding, which are organised by 
their link to the same category (i.e., the self). 
Following this early work on the nature of self-reference effects on memory, there 
was a relatively long period in which the effects were studied largely through the prism of a 
single paradigm: the trait recall task, requiring conscious consideration of self-knowledge. 
However, over the past decade there has been a significant increase in the diversity of self-
referencing tasks used to explore memory patterns. In one of the first of these studies, our 
own lab explored the impact of item ownership on memory (Cunningham, MacDonald, Turk, 
& Macrae, 2008). As alluded to above, ownership paradigms are a useful way of exploring 
self-reference because participants can encode a series of items during a game in which 
they are temporarily assigned ownership over half of the items. In our study, pairs of 
participants were asked to imagine they had each won a basket full of shopping (e.g., 
apples, juice, socks), but they had to sort the items out into a self-owned and other-owned 
set. This was done on the basis of colour-matching a dot on the card with the colour of each 
participant’s basket. Once all the cards had been sorted, the participants were separated 
and asked to complete a recognition memory test, in which they were presented with ‘self-
owned’, ‘other-owned’ and new items. Participants showed a reliable self-reference effect, 
or ‘ownership effect’, which we suggested was akin to the classic self-reference effect in 
memory established by Rogers et al. (1977). 
The ownership effect may arise as a result of the same cognitive processes that 
support self-references trait recall. For example, participants in the ownership paradigm 
who receive, say, the milk may be accessing their self-knowledge (e.g., “I need to pick up 
milk at the supermarket on the way home” or “The milk I my cereal was off this morning”). 
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However, this seems a much less compelling explanation than in the trait task, as there is no 
task necessity to reflect on personal knowledge during self-referent trials, and 
autobiographical memories may also be evoked by the other-referent items (“she got the 
chocolate biscuits, not me – how annoying!”). Rather, it is likely that attentional prioritising 
effects may play more of a role here. As described above, when participants perceive that 
an item belongs to them, this narrows their visuo-spatial attention on the item and elicits a 
P300 neural response (Turk et al., 2011). This increased attention evoked by self-owned 
items may be sufficient to boost memory, even without the elaboration and organisation 
support provided by consideration of self-knowledge in the trait task. 
Intrigued by this possibility, a second set of experiments explored what the minimal 
conditions were in which a self-reference effect on memory could be elicited. This time, we 
adapted the trait encoding paradigm so that it was presented on screen with either the 
participant’s own face or a celebrity’s face, and a trait word positioned above or below the 
face (Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008). In this ‘evaluative’ version of task, the participant 
was simply asked whether the trait word described the person shown. This adaptation of 
Rogers et al.’s paradigm allowed us to exactly match an ‘incidental’ version of the task, in 
which participants were simply asked to report whether or not the word was presented 
above the face. This second version was designed to tests a minimal self-reference effect, 
because the identity of the referent was completely incidental to the task. Nonetheless, a 
subsequent recognition memory test showed that the incidental version of the task elicited 
a self-reference effect on memory: participants were more likely to remember the words 
shown with their own face, even though they had not been asked to evaluate the trait with 
reference to the themselves. 
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The self-reference effects in memory produced by this range of very different tasks 
suggests that there may be a range of self-reference effects, supported by different 
systems. These differences can be drawn out by neuroimaging studies that can distinguish 
between the cortical activity associated with different SRE tasks, although there are 
common neural elements. In particular, research across multiple paradigms has identified 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) as consistently associated with self-referencing. This 
area may operate as a ‘gateway’ to enhanced self-processing. However, different systems 
are more task-specific – for example, the ownership effect is associated with affect 
processing and reward networks which are not activated by the trait recall task. It is clear 
that there is not just one self-processing system, or one way in which the self influences 
thought. Rather, many different mechanisms (e.g., attention, perception, affective 
processing, support by self-knowledge) can be heightened when cues of self-relevance are 
identified, combining to enhance memory. 
Given the automaticity of many effects associated with self-processing, it is 
unsurprising that self-reference effects emerge relatively early in human development. 
While the trait paradigm precludes the testing of young children (due to language and 
conceptual difficulties), ownership tasks and other incidental self reference tasks have 
suggested that children as young as three can show a strong self-bias. We tested this using 
an adapted ownership task, asking pairs of children to sort out a series of cards into 
coloured baskets by matching a coloured outline on the card to the colour of the basket. 
(Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae, & Turk, 2013). The participants were each given ownership 
of one of the baskets (e.g., the red basket) and asked to imagine that the owner of the 
basket owned all the items (toys, clothes, food) on the card that went into that basket. A 
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subsequent recognition memory test showed that participants had a reliable memory 
advantage for the self-owned items over those owned by the other participant, just like a 
typical adult sample. 
Although self-reference effects on memory have been shown in early childhood, it is 
not currently clear when these memory effects first emerge. Even very young babies learn 
to separate themselves and their own body from the external environment (e.g., shown by 
repeatedly kicking a toy for a rewarding noise), and respond to their own name from about 
four months. When children begin to vocalise, it is very evident that ownership plays a very 
important role in early socialisation. The first two-word combinations generally concern 
personal pronouns and ownership (“my cup”, “Mummy’s chair”) and the majority of 
disputes between playmates and siblings at two to three years of age concern ownership of 
desired items (“I had it first!”). Finally, self-descriptions produced by children at this age are 
reported to include a high number of possessions, such that a three-year-old is more likely 
to describe himself as ‘having blue shoes’ when asked who he is than a ten-year-old. The 
social and personal importance of ownership in the early years serves to highlight how 
fundamental self-processing systems are in human cognition; their influence may grow 
across childhood and remain important into old age, but its roots are already measureable 
at an early stage. 
An caveat to the conclusion that self-biases are fundamental and adaptive human 
systems has emerged recently in the form of cultural differences. Comparisons of self-
reference effects in memory from individualistic and collectivist cultures suggests that the 
reliable self-reference effect widely reported in Western literature is significantly 
moderated and sometimes even negated in Eastern cultures. Participants in published 
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research studies overwhelmingly come from industrialised ‘Western’ cultures which tend to 
promote an individualistic culture in which self is considered central (e.g., the USA). Children 
in these cultures are encouraged to strive to be themselves and follow their dreams, with 
personal success being a socially acceptable goal. In contrast, collectivist cultures associated 
with countries such as China and Japan tend to promote achievement as part of a social 
group, so relations between individuals and their place in the hierarchy are more important 
than personal characteristics. Participants from collectivist cultures show a reduced self-
reference effect, reduced ownership effect, and less self-other differentiation in terms of 
neural response. There are two potential explanations for this. One is that self-processing 
biases (i.e., the effects of self on attention and memory) are hard-wired but can be 
moderated by immersion in a collectivist culture. The second is that self-biases arise as a 
response to individualistic emphasis in Western culture, so are created rather than naturally 
emergent. We do not currently have sufficient data to determine which of these 
explanations is correct, but it is clear that the neural architecture exists for self-reference 
effects on memory to be robustly exhibited in an individualistic context, even if they can be 
modulated by culture. 
 
2.5.3 Our self-directed memories make us who we are (and are not) 
While the effects discussed above concern how our thoughts are influenced by the 
self, a second central issue is how our thoughts produce our self. There is a strong argument 
to be made for the perspective that our memories about ourselves create and maintain who 
we are. The neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (2003) neatly encapsulates this argument by 
stating that “[b]ecause you are a unique individual, the particular multifaceted aspects of the 
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self that define “you” are present in your brain alone.  And in order to remain who you are 
from minute to minute, day to day, and year to year, your brain must somehow retain the 
essence of who you are over time.  In the end then, the self is essentially a memory, or more 
accurately, a set of memories.” (p. 298). Understanding how the brain deals with self-
directed (i.e., autobiographical) memories is therefore critical to understanding identity. 
One of the key issues of any identity system is than of 
coherence. Individuals tend to have a relatively coherent 
picture of themselves as possessing personality characteristics 
(e.g., I am kind but stubborn). This is similar to a stereotype in 
that it is a structure of person information associated with a 
certain group (or in this case, individual) which is resistant to 
change, and alters or filters incoming information to preserve coherence. It is also biased by 
the rose-tinted spectacles that ensure most people preserve a positive self-concept. For 
example, when thinking about myself as ‘kind’, I may bring to mind the time I looked after a 
friend’s child when she was stuck at work, or when I gave my hat to a homeless man in cold 
weather. However, the times I failed to answer the telephone to that same friend’s number, 
or walked past the homeless man while deliberately looking the other way are not stored 
with my self-concept because they would challenge this coherent identity. While identity is 
complex and most people acknowledge that they can display contradictory behaviours at 
times, a key feature of autobiographical memories is to create the illusion of a coherent 
personality existing across time. In the inevitable trade-off between accuracy and 
coherence, the autobiographical memory system seems to err more on the side of 
coherence. 
Coherence: In the context of 
self-processing, coherence is the 
maintenance of a consistent and 
stable self-concept through the 
filtering of inconsistent 
information or memories. 
16 
 
The bias toward coherence is encapsulated in Conway’s (2005) influential self-
memory system (SMS) model of autobiographical memory. This model describes two 
elements combining to create and maintain our sense of self. The first system is the store of 
self-knowledge, here termed the autobiographical knowledge base. This is the repository in 
long-term memory in which all personal ‘episodic’ memories are stored, in addition to 
semantic knowledge derived from autobiographical events (e.g., the episodic memory “I 
remember my wedding day” can give rise over time to the semantic knowledge “I am 
married”). Access to this self-relevant material is controlled by the second component of 
Conway’s model, the ‘working self’, a proposed constituent of working memory. The 
working self manages a set of active goals, which can increase or decrease the activation of 
autobiographical knowledge. In line with the coherence argument, the working self is based 
on the premise that memory is not accurate, what is processed at encoding (and passed to 
long-term memory) is dependent on congruence with current processing goals. One 
perpetual current goal is maintenance of the conceptual self, resolving discrepancies 
between actual behaviour or outcomes, and our ideal selves. In addition, the self balancing 
the activation of the current goal hierarchy which includes both short term (e.g., “I must 
post this letter”) and long term (“I must get this degree”) goals. If an episode is consistent 
with any of these goals (behaviour that reinforces kind personality; posting of the letter; 
revising for the exam) then that episode is likely to be stored in long-term memory. If not, 
like much of daily experience, it is ‘destined to be forgotten’. For short term goals, accuracy 
is more important; for long-term goals, it is coherence that has priority. In Conway’s model, 
the goal hierarchy determines encoding likelihood, the accessibility of knowledge from the 
autobiographical knowledge base, and the creation of new long-term memories. In other 
words, according to Conway, this system creates our identity. 
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There is evidence that corresponds with the SMS model, such as the fact that people 
do tend to remember episodes that have either a high degree of correspondence or discord 
between the events and current goals (e.g., failing an exam or giving birth), and events that 
either fit with the self-concept or create a self-defining moment (e.g., having a conversation 
that changes one’s career path). However, these patterns are difficult to test empirically as 
they are associative so causation is difficult to determine – for example, self-defining 
moments and experiences closely tied to personal goals are likely to be highly emotional, 
which could also account for their memorability. It seems clear that in line with LeDoux’s 
intuitive explanation, we are what we remember. 
Another feature of autobiographical memory that highlights its link to the self-
concept is ‘childhood amnesia’ or infantile amnesia, the difficulty people have in retrieving 
memories that were formed before they were three or four years of age. Various 
explanations for childhood amnesia suggest a role for developing language processing and 
narrative creation, but an influential and compelling proposal is that childhood amnesia 
occurs because in the early years, the objective self (with its self-knowledge framework) has 
yet to develop sufficiently to support the organisation of memories. Before this framework 
is established, memories can be formed but storage and retrieval quickly disintegrate when 
there is no organising structure in memory. There are interesting findings consistent with 
this proposal although, again, empirical evidence is difficult to ascertain because children’s 
development cannot be manipulated. There are associations between the ability to self-
recognise (showing an objective self) and having more reliable memory for events. In one 
study, Howe, Courage, and Edison (2003) tested young toddlers on two occasions. On the 
first occasion, the child watched a toy being put in a cupboard. On the second occasion, the 
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children’s memory for the event was tested by asking them the toy location. It was found 
that memory was more likely in children who had developed an objective self (again shown 
by mirror self-recognition). While this evidence remains associative, in combination with the 
autobiographical memory system described above it is consistent with the bi-directional link 
between the self and the memory system: what we remember makes us who we are, and 
who we are directs what we remember. 
 
2.5.4 The breakdown of the self 
Given the strong, reciprocal links between the self and cognitive processes, it is 
unsurprising that any severance of the links or damage to one of the components can have a 
devastating effect on the experience of self. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by 
amnesic patients who have lost the ability to form new memories, and who experience a 
calamitous loss of their sense of self. Sacks (1985) reports a detailed and moving case study 
of Jimmie G, a 49 year old man who lost the ability to form memories as a result of 
Korsakoff’s syndrome. Jimmie remained effectively stuck in time as a 19 year old, unable to 
update his memory of himself to form any meaningful understanding of his life or identity as 
a grown man. In effect, he had lost his self. Sacks describes a traumatic event in which he 
exposed Jimmie to his own reflection in the mirror. Jimmie was confused and devastated by 
his mirror image, which showed a man decades older than the self-concept he held in 
memory. However, he recovered quickly from the distress because he had soon lost all 
recollection of the mirror event. As Sacks points out, Jimmie’s lack of awareness of the loss 
of himself is telling: “If a man has lost a leg or an eye, he knows he has lost a leg or an eye; 
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but if he has lost a self – himself – he cannot know it, because he is no longer there to know 
it” (p. 34).  
An instructive comparison can be made between patients with profound amnesia, 
and people with dementia disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease. As with Sack’s amnesic 
patient Jimmie, patients with dementia can often lose the ability to form new memories and 
to update their sense of self. Thus cases of mirror misidentification are not unusual, in 
which the patient is unable to recognise himself or herself in a mirror. As described above, 
being able to recognise oneself is considered diagnostic of the development of the objective 
self in childhood, so this seems a particularly profound regression in dementia patients. 
However, rather than losing their sense of self, there is evidence of some preservation, at 
least before the late stages of dementia (Pearce, Clare, & Pistrang, 2002). Patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease, for example, may use first-person speech and recall childhood events 
despite not being able to remember the previous day. They may also struggle to reconcile 
current experiences with the stored sense of self, a task that can be made more difficult by 
the perception of altered social treatment by others. The pattern is closely related to other 
amnesia experiences, painting a picture of a deteriorating and out-of-date objective self, 
combined with mismatching preservation of the subjective or embodied self. 
As well as self-processing being affected by acquired amnesia or dementia, there are 
some developmental disorders which may produce atypical patterns of self-reference 
effects. In particular, autism spectrum disorder (ASD) may change the way in which people 
process information about both themselves and other people. Children with ASD are able to 
recognise themselves and can describe autobiographical events, although they may not do 
this to the same degree as neurotypical children. However, ASD can also affect how the self 
20 
 
influences cognition, evidenced by difference patterns of self-reference effects in memory 
than neurotypical controls. For example, people with ASD show reduced a ownership effect 
in adulthood and some studies suggest a reduced self-reference effect in childhood. ASD is a 
complex disorder however, encompassing a range of social processing differences, and we 
have recently found that the strength of self-processing biases depends on the symptoms of 
the individual (Gillespie-Smith, Ballantyne, Branigan, Turk & Cunningham, 2018). For 
participants with mild ASD symptoms, we found a large ownership effect, perhaps as a 
result of low interest in other people (i.e., not paying much attention to the other person’s 
owned items in the sorting task). In contrast, people with more severe symptoms showed 
no ownership effect, remembering a similar number of self-owned and other-owned items. 
This may reflect a more serious disruption of the self-system. While still in their early stages, 
studies of self-reference effects within populations who show impaired or atypical self- and 
social-processing patterns can provide much real insight into the complex relationship 
between self-processing, other-processing and cognition. 
 
Conclusions 
 A theoretical understanding of how the self influences thought, and how thought 
influences cognition, is an important flagstone of the embodies cognition literature. here, 
we argue that the functional importance of self-cues in the environment have led to their 
ability to reliably capture and sustain attention, and to the increased memorability of 
information encoded with reference to self. The self-memory system in particular is critical 
to our sense of identity, both forming and maintaining our sense of self to the extent that its 
disruption by neurological damage can be devastated for individuals. By understanding the 
21 
 
cognitive mechanisms through which the self operates on cognition, we improve our 
understanding of how the self is created and interacts with the external environment, 
underpinning models of embodiment.  
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